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events and causal relations between them, for there will be no event of Jones's fail-
ure, and hence no causal relation between his failure and the fire. The network model 
cannot accommodate the fact-if it is a fact-that Jones's failure caused the fire, and 
hence cannot be the whole causal truth about reality. 
How should we solve the problem? One solution-the one I favor-is to hang 
onto the network model of causation and deny that there is any causation by ab-
sence. On this view, Smith's failure to water her office plants was not a cause of their 
death. This seems to be a deeply unpopular solution-and surprisingly so, given the 
prevalence of the network model in contemporary metaphysics. Here's what Lewis 
has to say about it in "Void and Object" (chapter 10, this volume): "We could deny, 
in the face of compelling evidence to the contrary, that absences ever cause anything. 
·We could deny, for instance, that the void is deadly .... Simply to state this response 
is to complete the reductio against it." 3 
The other obvious solution is to hang onto causation by absence and scrap the 
network model. This is the solution for which Hugh Mellor has long been arguing, 4 
and has been suggested more recently by Lewis in "Void and Object." According to 
Mellor's view, causation is not a relation-or at least, the most basic kind of causa-
tion is not relational. Rather, causal facts have the form "E because C," where C 
and E are facts and "because" is a sentential connective. Since facts are not partic-
ulars, on Mellor's view causation is not a relation. And since facts can be facts about 
absences, causation by absence causes no special problems on his view. In much the 
same vein, Lewis proposes that causation be analyzed in terms of counterfactual de-
pendence not between events, but between propositions-propositions that need not 
assert that some event or other occurs. 
A third solution-one that is suggested but not condoned by Lewis in "Void and 
Object"-is to take the relational kind of causation as the most basic kind of causa-
tion, and define causation by absence in terms of relational causation. 5 According to 
this kind of solution, the network model captures all the basic causal facts, but there 
are other causal facts whose obtaining supervenes on the actual pattern of causal 
relations together with some extra counterfactuals. 
I shall call the first view the re/ationist view, since it upholds the thesis that causa-
tion is a relation between events. I call the other two views nonre/ationist views, since 
they both uphold the thesis that causation is not always a relation. The central claim 
of this essay is that, if our aim is to do as much justice as possible to commonsense 
intuitions about causation by absence, then it doesn't much matter whether we up-
hold relationism or nonrelationism. 
This might seem like a surprising claim, since relationism, unlike nonrelationism, 
is forced to deny a whole host of causal claims that common sense holds true. As I 
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said at the beginning, undoubtedly many of us think that Jones's failure to close the 
fire doors was a cause of the fire, or that the lack of rain was a cause of the bush fire, 
and so on. Fair point: The relationist view really does deny all of that. But this is to 
tell only half the story. For common sense also makes a lot of negative causal claims 
about absences. Take Brown, who lives on the other side of the city and has no con-
nection whatever with either Smith or Jones. Commonsense intuition has it, I think, 
that neither Brown's failure to close the fire doors nor his failure to water Smith's 
plants were causes of the fire or of the plants' death. The relationist view, of course, 
gets these cases right: Brown's omissions are not causes, because no absences-and 
therefore no omissions-are. But nonrelationism gets these negative causal judgments 
wrong. According to the relationist, the commonsense claim that Jones's omission 
caused the fire is false; according to the nonrelationist, the commonsense claim that 
Brown's omission did not cause the fire is false. 
So when it comes to doing justice to commonsense intuitions about causation by 
absence, neither view fares very well. Luckily, I don't think this matters very much. 
Briefly, the reason it doesn't much matter is this. As I'll argue in sections 2 and 3, 
commonsense intuitions about which absences are causes and which aren't are highly 
dependent on judgments that it would be highly implausible to suppose correspond 
to any real worldly difference at the level of the metaphysics of causation. For in-
stance, sometimes common sense judges the moral status of an absence to be relevant 
to its causal status. But no philosopher working within the tradition I'm concerned 
with here thinks that the truih conditions for causal claims contain a moral element. 
It follows that whatever we think about whether or not causation is a relation, we're 
going to have to concede that common sense is just wrong when it takes, say, moral 
differences to determine causal differences. There is no genuine causal difference be-
tween those cases that common sense judges to be cases of causation by absence and 
those that it judges not to be cases of causation by absence. Hence both the rela-
tionist and the nonrelationist must agree, and with good reason, that commonsense 
judgments about causation by absence are often mistaken-though of course they 
disagree about which commonsense judgments are mistaken. 
In sections 4 and 5, I show how absences can figure in causal explanations even 
though they do not cause anything. So although it is false to say that Smith's failure 
to water her office plants caused their death, it is nevertheless true to say that the 
plants died because Smith failed to water them. Here I appeal to Lewis's analysis of 
causal explanation, according to which to explain an event is to provide information 
about its causal history: information that need not be restricted merely to citing the 
event's causes. I claim that common sense judges some absences to be causes because 
it fails to distinguish between causation and causal explanation, and (in section 6) 
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that the sorts of distinctions discussed in sections 2 and 3 that ground commonsense 
assertions and denials of causation by absence are best seen as distinctions between 
explanatorily salient and nonsalient absences. The moral is that commonsense intui-
tions about causation by absence are no more damaging to the relationist than they 
are to the nonrelationist; hence, those intuitions provide no good reason for aban-
doning the network model of causation. 
2 Causation by Absence and Common Sense 
In what follows, I'm going to assume that absences that are causes-if there are 
any-are at least necessary conditions of their effects. I dare say this is a· false as-
sumption: Maybe (again, if there is any causation by absence at all) there are cases 
where, had the absent event occurred, the effect in question would still have had 
some chance of coming about. I ignore this possibility for the sake of simplicity. 
With the assumption that absences are at least necessary conditions of what they 
cause in place, we might try the following definition of causation by absence: 
(I) The nonoccurrence of an event of type A caused event b if and only if, had an 
A-type event occurred, b would not have occurred. 
This definition is different from both Lewis's and Dowe's, 6 and may well be inad-
equate for reasons other than the one discussed below. However, since both Lewis's 
and Dowe's definitions can easily be seen to fall prey to the objection too, it will 
make things easier if we make do with the simpler definition (I). 
Not surprisingly, (I) gets the right answer in cases that common sense judges to 
be genuine cases of causation by absence. Here are some examples. 7 Flora normally 
gratuitously waters her neighbor's orchids. But she stops watering them, and they 
die. Common sense judges that Flora's omission was a cause of the orchids' death, 
since had she watered them, as she usually does, the orchids would not have died. 
Second example: Z's dog is bitten by an insect, contracting an eye disease as a result, 
which Z ignores. The dog loses its sight. Intuitively, Z's negligence caused the dog's 
blindness; and again, the definition gets this right: Had Z not ignored the eye disease, 
the dog would not have lost its sight. Third example: An old tree decays and falls to 
the ground, crushing some rare wild flowers. The park ranger failed to inspect the 
tree, thereby making himself a cause of the flowers' death. Again, (I) gets this right: 
Had the park ranger inspected the tree (and thus had it carefully removed rather than 
allowing it to fall), the flowers would have survived. Fourth example: A geranium 
survives the London winter because there is no frost. Intuitively the absence of frost 
was a cause of its survival; and, once again, this judgment is in accordance with (I). 
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So far so good. The trouble is that our definition is too inclusive: It renders all 
sorts of absences as causes that common sense does not recognize as causes. Com-
monsense intuition identifies Flora's failure to water the orchids as a cause of their 
death, but not the failure of the other neighbors, and certainly not the failure of 
people on the other side of the world who neither know nor care about the orchids-
even though it's perfectly true of each of them that had they watered the orchids, 
they would not have died. Similarly, while common sense judges the dog owner's or 
the park ranger's omission to be a cause of the dog's blindness or the crushing of 
the flowers, it does not judge the omissions of others as causes of those events, even 
though the relevant counterfactuals are true too. And similarly for the geranium 
example: We would ordinarily judge that the absence of a hungry geranium-eating 
koala was no part of the causal history of the geranium's survival, even though had 
such a koala been present the geranium would not have survived. 
Why is this? What grounds common sense's discrimination between absences that 
are and are not causes of an event? Hart and Honore, in their book Causation in the 
Law-a classic text for those interested in commonsense causal judgments-claim 
that what makes us single out one omission as a cause but not another is abnormal-
ity. We regard Flora's failure to water her neighbor's orchids as a cause of their 
death because Flora's failure is abnormal: She normally does water them. On the 
other hand, there is nothing abnormal in the failure of the other neighbors, or of 
other people in other countries, to water the orchids; hence, those failures are not 
causes of the orchids' death. 8 
The abnormality criterion seems to work for the orchid case, and it seems plausible 
to suppose that it also works for cases like the geranium case: cases that are not 
omissions by human agents. The absence of frost in winter in London is quite un-
usual, and hence according to Hart and Honore's criterion may count as a cause of 
the geranium's survival. The absence of hungry geranium-eating koalas, on the other 
hand, is perfectly normal, and hence does not qualify as a cause of the geranium's 
survival. 
Stapleton claims, however-and I think she's right-that there are many cases in 
which the abnormality criterion fails to explain our commonsense causal judgments. 
In the case of Z's dog, for instance, she says that we would regard Z's conduct as 
a cause "because against the backdrop of Z's ownership of the dog we expect Z to 
have acted, not because of expectations generated by past conduct but for moral 
reasons" (1994, p. 122). And in the park ranger case, she says, we single out the park 
ranger and nobody else because she, and nobody else, has a legal duty to inspect the 
tree. The point here is that we take these causal judgments to be correct even if the 
relevant omissions are not in any way abnormal: The judgments stand even if Z is 
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generally very bad at looking after his dog, or if it is the park ranger's first day on 
the job. 
Stapleton also claims that whether an omission is to count as a cause can depend 
on epistemic features. Suppose, for instance, that a certain drug in fact has harmful 
side effects, but that this risk is unforeseeable: We could not reasonably expect the 
drug manufacturer to have known about it. In such a case, she says, we should not 
say "it was the defendant-manufacturer's failure to warn of the unforeseeable risk 
which caused the injury-clearly a silly idea which no common sense version of cau-
sation could accommodate" (ibid., p. 124). On the other hand, if the manufacturer 
did know of the risk, or if we could reasonably have expected them to have found out 
about the risk, then we would say that their failure to warn consumers of the risk was 
a cause of the side effects. 
So it seems that common sense singles out an absence as a cause when, and only 
when, it stands out in some way-either from what normally happens, or from some 
norm the absence of which (generally an omission) counts as a violation. The norm 
might be moral, legal, or epistemic, as Stapleton's examples illustrate; but other sorts 
of norm may well play a similar role. Owen's failure to get to the ball after Beckham's 
cross into the penalty area counts as a cause of England's defeat, but Seaman's fail-
ure to do so does not-even though, had Seaman (the goalkeeper) somehow managed 
to get to the ball, he would undoubtedly have scored and England would have won. 
Why? Because Owen is an attacker and Seaman is the goalkeeper; it's an attacker's 
job, and not the goalkeeper's, to score goals from crosses into the penalty area. 
What all this points toward is a definition of causation by absence that goes some-
thing like this: 
(II) The absence of an A-type event caused b if and only if 
(i) b counterfactually depends on the absence: Had an A-type event occurred, b 
would not have occurred; and 
(ii) the absence of an A-type event is either abnormal or violates some moral, legal, 
epistemic, or other norm. 
This definition, I think, does justice to as many commonsense causal judgments 
about absences as anyone could wish for. The trouble is that although it works qua 
linguistic analysis of the ordinary concept of causation by absence, it doesn't look 
like the sort of analysis we ought to be giving of the metaphysics of causation by 
absence. 
Take the violation-of-norms part of the definition. If we take the definition to give 
the truth conditions of causation by absence claims, then causal facts about absences 
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depend in part on normative facts: facts about whether a moral or epistemic or other 
norm has been violated. But nobody within the tradition of the metaphysics of 
causation that I'm concerned with here thinks that causal facts depend on human-
dependent norms. 
Even if taking causal facts to depend on normative facts weren't in itself such a 
bad thing, it would in any case make the truth of causal claims tum out to be a 
relative matter. For instance, you and I might differ in our epistemic standards, so 
that I count the side effects of a drug as foreseeable and you don't; hence I count the 
drug manufacturer's failure to warn consumers as a cause of their side effects but you 
do not. Either there is some absolute epistemic standard that marks out what some-
one can reasonably be expected to foresee-which seems wildly implausible-or the 
causal status of the. failure is relative to different standards. 
A similar point applies to the abnormality part of the definition. For one thing, 
how often something has to happen in order to count as "nonnal"-and hence for 
its absence to count as abnormal-is always going to be rather fluid. And for an-
other, the same absence might count as normal relative to one kind of regularity and 
abnormal relative to another. Suppose, for instance, that Flora is in the habit of 
doing gratuitous repetitive favors for her neighbors, like watering their gardens or 
washing their cars, but that she invariably stops doing them after a month or so. 
Now is Flora's failure to water her neighbor's orchids after thirty days of watering 
them normal or abnormal? There doesn't seem to be any principled way of answer-
ing that question, so it looks as though the causal status of her omission is simply 
indeterminate. 
It follows that if we want facts about causation to be reasonably determinate and 
not relative to extraneous facts about whether a putative cause happens to count 
as abnormal, immoral, illegal, or whatever, then any account of the metaphysics of 
causation by absence is going to have to be pretty revisionary: No adequate account 
of what in the world makes causal claims about absences true or false is going to be 
able to condone all, or even most, of the verdicts given by commonsense usage. 
3 A Way Out for the Nonrelationist? 
The definition (II) of causation by absence I proposed in the previous section had 
two conditions on when the absence of an A-type event is to count as a cause of 
b: the counterfactual condition-had an A-type event occurred, b would not have 
occurred-and the condition that the absence be either abnormal or the violation of 
some norm. I claimed that no respectable theory of the truth conditions of causal 
claims ought to respect the second of these conditions; which leaves us with the first, 
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counterfactual condition, that is, with (I). As we've already seen, an analysis of cau-
sation by absence that consisted solely in this condition would be far too inclusive. 
It would render all of us causally responsible for indefinitely many events happening 
right now, all over the world-and doubtless beyond. One of the causes of Maite's 
drinking her coffee in Mexico City just now was my failure to shoot her before she 
had a chance to put the kettle on. One of the causes of your reading these words right 
now is the absence of a lion from the room. And so on. 
But, in principle at least, the nonrelationist who thinks there really is such a thing 
as causation by absence is not required to think that there's that much causation by 
absence, for she might be able to invent a more restrictive definition that will do a lot 
better than what we've got so far. That is to say, maybe our original definition (I) can 
be supplemented by some other clause that rules out the spurious cases of causation 
by absence like the one I just gave, without ruling out the allegedly nonspurious cases 
we want to keep, but which doesn't appeal to normative features of absences. 
Well, on behalf of my nonrelationist opponent, I generously offer the following 
definition. It's the best I can do-but not, as we'll see, good enough: 
(III) The absence of an A-type event caused b if and only if: 
(i) if an A-type event had occurred, b would not have occurred; and 
(ii) an A-type event occurs at a world that is reasonably close to the actual world. 
The definition discounts vast numbers of absences from being causes on the 
grounds that worlds where the absent event occurs are very distant worlds. For in-
stance, my failure to shoot Maite no longer counts as a cause of her drinking her 
coffee because, I'm happy to say, a world where I do shoot her is a very distant world 
indeed. 
One might even go so far as to claim that the definition gets all the cases right 
(though I'll argue in a moment that it doesn't). We might try to claim, for instance, 
that what makes Flora's failure to water her neighbor's orchids a cause of their death 
but not the failure of her other neighbors is not, as we first thought, the fact that 
Flora's failure, unlike those of the other neighbors, is abnormal; rather, the difference 
is that Flora is more strongly disposed to water the orchids than are her neighbors-
as evidenced by the differences in her and their past behavior. So a world where 
Flora waters the orchids is closer to our own than is a world when another neighbor 
does so. Z's failure to attend to his dog's eye infection, as opposed to our failure, 
counts as a cause of its blindness because Z was in a position to do something about 
it and we were not: Hence a world where Z takes his dog to the vet is reasonably 
close to our own, and one where· one of us takes the dog to the vet is not. 
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The thought here, then, is that abnormality and violation of norms are not part 
of the truth conditions of causation by absence claims. Rather, those considerations 
inform our judgments about how reasonable it is-that is to say, epistemically 
reasonable-to expect the absent event to happen; and thus how reasonable it is 
to suppose that the event in question happens at a reasonably nearby world. For 
example, we generally assume that dog owners are disposed to behave in a way con-
ducive to the welfare of their pets, whereas people in general are not particularly 
disposed to go out of their way to behave in a way conducive to the welfare of other 
people's pets. And we can construe this assumption as an assumption about closeness 
of worlds: If Z is strongly disposed to keep a close eye on his dog's welfare and I 
am not, then a world where Z manifests this strong disposition and takes the dog 
to the vet is plausibly closer than a world where I, who have no disposition whatever 
to do so, take Z's dog to the vet for him. Hence Z's omission is a cause of the dog's 
blindness but mine is not. 
Things seem to be looking up for the nonrelationist; but unfortunately I don't 
think the situation is as rosy as I've made it look. I have two objections to the sug-
gested definition. First, I think that commonsense intuition would still discriminate 
between, say, Z's omission and mine even if we knew perfectly well that Z is a terri-
ble pet owner and consistently fails to look after his dog properly. Even if we think 
that Z has no disposition whatever to take the dog to the vet, and hence that a world 
where he does so is just as distant as a world where someone else does it for him, we 
still think of Z's omission and nobody else's as a cause of the dog's blindness. 
Similarly, we still judge a drug company's failure to warn consumers of foreseeable 
side effects as a cause of their illness even if we know that the company is extremely 
disreputable and rarely bothers to carry out the proper tests. I take it that common 
sense simply doesn't endorse the view that if you're negligent enough-if your dis-
position to behave in accordance with norms is weak enough-your negligence lit-
erally won't have any effects. 
These observations support my initial claim that the norms are doing the work by 
themselves, as it were, rather than merely informing our judgments about closeness 
of worlds. Still, I'm basing this conclusion on some disputable claims about com-
monsense intuition that you may not share, so this isn't a decisive objection. 
The second objection, I think, is more telling: I can see no sensible way of speci-
fying what "reasonably close" amounts to. It's one thing to judge relative similarity 
of worlds-to judge that, say, a world where Flora waters her neighbor's orchids is 
closer than any world where someone else waters them. But it's quite another thing 
to try and impose a metric on this ordering, so that any A-world within a certain 
distance from the actual world is close enough for the absence of A to count as a 
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cause, whereas any A-world outside that distance is too far away for the absence of A 
to count as a cause. 
Even if there were a way of specifying what "reasonably close" amounts to, there 
are two further problems. One is that any choice of maximum distance is going to be 
entirely arbitrary; and the question of which absences are causes and which are not 
ought not to be decided by a piece of arbitrary stipulation. The other problem is that 
whereas relative similarity of worlds might explain why one absence and not another 
counts as a cause in any particular case-Z's taking his dog to the vet happens in a 
close enough world, say, but not my taking it-I see no reason to suppose that the 
same standards will apply across all cases. What counts as close enough for causa-
tion in one case might not count as close enough for causation in another. 
All of these problems for the proposed definition (III), I think, have the same 
source: There just isn't any objective feature that some absences have and others lack 
in virtue of which some absences are causes and others are not. So any definition of 
causation by absence that seeks to provide a principled distinction between absences 
that are and are not causes is bound to fail: No such definition will succeed in carving 
nature at its joints. If this is right, then the nonrelationist is going to have to concede 
that there just is no principled reason to regard Flora's failure to water the orchids as 
a cause of their death but not to regard my failure to shoot Maite as a cause of her 
coffee-drinking. And this, I suggest, hardly puts nonrelationism ahead of relationism 
when it comes to doing justice to commonsense intuitions. 
In fact, there is another possible way out of the problem for the nonrelationist, and 
that is to deny that the alleged distinction in our commonsense talk and thought be-
tween absences that are and are not causes really exists. I have been claiming that, 
according to commonsense intuition, Flora's failure to water her neighbor's orchids 
was a cause of their death, but the failure of other people-people who neither know 
nor care about the orchids-was not. But one might object that this is not really the 
position endorsed by common sense. Rather, in ordinary circumstances we fail to 
identify the failures of other people as causes of the orchids' death, in the sense that it 
does not occur to us to mention those failures' part in the causal history of the death 
of the orchids (since in ordinary conversational circumstances it would be inappro-
priate for us to do so). But to fail to mention that those other failures are causes is 
not to hold that they are not causes. 
No doubt there is some truth in this suggestion. Perhaps, if asked directly whether 
the failures of other people to water the orchids was a cause of their death, at least 
some people would say yes-presumably because they would appreciate the similar-
ity between Flora's failure, which they do count as a cause, and the failures of those 
other people. 
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I see no reason to suppose, however, that the point generalizes. The number of 
possible events, or combinations of events, that are such that, had they occurred, the 
orchids would not have died, is absolutely enormous. The plants would have sur-
vived, for example, if Flora's neighbor had installed a sprinkler system that then got 
activated accidentally while she was away, or if her roof had started leaking at a 
point just above the orchids during a rainstorm, or if a cow had somehow entered her 
house and flicked a nearby glass of water onto the orchids with its tail, or-. I do not 
think that most people would happily accept that the failure of each of these events 
to occur was equally a cause of the orchids' death. Of course, this is an empirical 
claim about what people are ordinarily inclined to judge. But I have not come across 
any evidence to suggest that the claim is false. 
4 Causation and Causal Explanation 
I shall return to the commonsense distinction between absences that are and are 
not causes in section 6. In this section and the next, however, I set this issue aside in 
order to focus on another distinction: the distinction between causation and causal 
explanation. In this section I defend the view that not all causal explanations are 
reports of causation: The explanans of a causal explanation need not stand to the 
explanandum as cause to effect. And in section 5 I defend the view that causal 
explanations that involve facts about absences can be seen as explanations of just this 
kind: We do not need absences as causes in order for facts about absences to be the 
explananta of causal explanations. 
In "Causal Relations" (1967), Davidson argues for a distinction between causa-
tion and causal explanation by concentrating on the logical form of causal state-
ments. He argues, using a version of the "Slingshot" example, that causation is a 
relation between events rather than facts-in other words, that the canonical form of 
causal statements is "c caused e," where c and e are events and caused is a two-place 
relation, rather than "E because C," where C and E are facts and "because" is a 
sentential connective. Davidson reserves the "E because C" locution for causal ex-
planation. For Davidson, then, no causal explanations are themselves causal claims, 
since they simply do not have the right logical form. 
In opposition to Davidson, Mellor has long maintained that all causal explana-
tions are in fact causal claims. For Mellor, facts are the most basic kind of causal 
relata, and the canonical form of causal statements is "E because C."9 According 
to Mellor, causation sometimes also relates events-but only sometimes. When it's 
true that the match lit because I struck it, it's also true that the striking caused the 
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lighting; but when it's true that, say, Kim has no children because she used contra-
ception, there is no corresponding true statement of the form "c caused e." 10 
If absences are to figure in causal explanations without doing any causing, there 
must be a distinction between causation and causal explanation: Some causal expla-
nations cannot be reports of causation. But this latter claim needs to be defended 
against the following objection: How, one might ask, can a causal explanation be 
genuinely causal if the explanans doesn't stand to the explanandum as cause to 
effect? Or, as Mellor puts it, "how can facts explain other facts causally without 
causing them?" (1995, p. 130). Well, here I want to appeal to Lewis's theory of ex-
planation. For Lewis, "to explain an event is to provide some information about its 
causal history" (1986b, p. 217); and the causal history of an event, he says, is "a 
relational structure" (ibid., p. 216). Not surprisingly, then, Lewis's account of expla-
nation is tailor-made to fit the network model of causation. For present purposes, the 
most important feature of Lewis's account of explanation is that it does not amount 
to the view that every explanation involves picking out a cause (or some causes) of 
an event; the way in which causal facts enter into an explanation can be more com-
plex than that. One can give information about an event's causal history in all sorts 
of other ways-by saying, for instance, that certain events or kinds of event do not 
figure in its causal history, or by saying that an event of such-and-such kind occurred, 
rather than that some particular event occurred. The moral here, then, is that some-
thing can be the explanans of a causal explanation without itself being a cause of the 
event cited in the explanandum. 
For example, suppose that Lee Harvey Oswald really did shoot JFK. Then the 
following three sentences are all true: 
(1) Oswald's shot caused JFK's death. 
(2) JFK died because Oswald shot him. 
(3) JFK died because somebody shot him. 
On Mellor's view, all three are causal truths. On Lewis's view (as expressed in 
Lewis 1973a, 1986b,c), only the first is, strictly speaking, a causal truth; the second 
and third are causal explanations rather than reports of causation. It's pretty obvious 
what makes (2) a causal explanation: Each of the explanans and the explanandum 
asserts that a particular event (Oswald's shot and JFK's death respectively) occurred, 
and those two events are in fact causally related. The case of (3) is a little more 
complicated: Here, the explanans does not assert that a particular event occurred, for 
there is no event essentially describable as someone's shooting JFK. Such an event 
would be disjunctive: It would be the event of Lee Harvey Oswald's shooting or the 
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man on the grassy knoll's shooting or Jackie Kennedy's shooting or ... and so on. 
And there is no more such an event than there is an event of my-birthday-party-or-
your-morning-bath. 11 Rather, the explanans of (3) asserts that there was some event 
or other that was a shooting of JFK by someone. Hence the explanans of (3) does 
not stand to the explanandum as cause to effect. Nonetheless, (3) still counts as a 
true causal explanation because, although it doesn't tell us which event caused JFK's 
death, it tells us something about the death's causal history, namely, that it included 
a shooting by someone. 
The notion of providing information about an event's causal history is further 
expanded by Jackson and Pettit's account of program and process explanations. 12 
This account is designed to show how multiply realizable properties (like functional 
and dispositional properties) can figure in true causal explanations without being 
"causally efficacious." For example, suppose that to be fragile is to be disposed to 
break when dropped, and that a glass is dropped and duly breaks. We recognize that 
it is the glass's molecular structure that causes it to break, and not its fragility; but we 
do not want to conclude that the fragility cannot figure in a worthwhile explanation 
of why it broke. (Likewise, we do not want the view that mental states are functional 
states to preclude the possibility of explaining, say, actions in terms of beliefs and 
desires.) 
Jackson and Pettit's solution to the problem is to distinguish between "process" 
and "p.rogram" explanation. "Process" explanation is explanation in terms of actual 
underlying physical processes: an explanation of why the glass broke in terms of 
molecular structure, say, or an explanation of why I went to the shop in terms of 
my neural processes. Program explanations, on the other hand, tell us not what the 
actual underlying processes were, but rather that those processes satisfy a particu-
lar functional or dispositional or higher-order description. The presence of fragility 
"programs for" the presence of a causally efficacious molecular property. Although 
it is the actually present causally efficacious property, and not the programming 
property, that figures in the causal history of the breakage, the program explanation 
still tells us something about that causal history-namely, that it involves some effi-
cacious property or other for which fragility programs. 
As Jackson and Pettit say: 
The process story tells us about how the history actually went: say that such and such partic-
ular decaying atoms were responsible for the radiation. A program account tells us about how 
that history might have been ... telling us for example that in any relevantly similar situation, 
as in the original situation itself, the fact that some atoms are decaying means that there will be 
a property realized-that involving the decay of such and such particular atoms-which is 
sufficient in the circumstances to produce radiation. In the actual world it was this, that and 
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the other atom which decayed and led to the radiation but in possible worlds where their place 
is taken by other atoms, the radiation still occurs. 13 
If we adopt Lewis's analysis of causal explanation, then, we can distinguish be-
tween causation and causal explanation and still be able to say why causal explana-
tions count as causal explanations; for such explanations can give information about 
the causal history of the event to be explained even though the explanans does not 
stand to the explanandum as cause to effect. 
5 How Can Causally Inert Absences Explain Anything? 
In the last section, I defended tP,e view that facts can causally explain without being 
causes of what they explain. In this section, I argue that facts about absences, omis-
sions, and failures do just that. The "because" locution is-or at least sometimes 
is-an explanatory locution; moreover, as we have seen, "because" claims can be 
true-can reveal information about causal history-without the explanans standing 
to the explanandum as cause to effect. So we can repudiate the claim that absences 
can be causes and perfectly well grant that there are true causal explanations whose 
explananta concern absences. 
First, though, a point about the logical form of causation by absence claims. Much 
of the time in our everyday talk, we speak as if absences, omissions, and failures are 
things. We say that the void is deadly just as we would say that the Chrysler Building 
is very tall: The sentence has the same subject-predicate form, and we count it as 
true, even though there could be no object in the world picked out by the definite 
description "the void." Similarly, we say that Flora's failure to water the orchids 
caused their death just as we might, in different circumstances, say that Flora's 
throwing them on the fire, or cutting them up, caused their death. Our everyday 
causation-by-absence claims often have the logical form of a relational sentence-
and we count them as true-even though one of the singular terms flanking the re-
lation does not refer to anything. Absences, omissions, and failures get assimilated to 
the familiar ontological category of events even though they are not events. 
So what? Well, suppose for a moment that there really is causation by absence, as 
the nonrelationist claims. Even so, one ought to think that expressing causation by 
absence facts using the "c caused e" locution is at best highly misleading. For such 
sentences have a relational form, yet whatever it is that makes them true, it is not the 
obtaining of any relation. The discussion in section 4 suggests an obvious paraphrase 
of causation-by-absence claims into the "because" locution: A more ontologically 
perspicuous way of saying that Flora's failure to water the orchids caused their death 
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is to say that the orchids died-or that their death occurred-because Flora failed to 
water them. 
The relationist, on the other hand, cannot claim that "the orchids died because 
Flora failed to water them" is a paraphrase of "Flora's failure caused the orchids' 
death," for, although we can perhaps paraphrase away the relational form of the 
latter sentence, we cannot paraphrase away the fact that it is a causal claim; and 
according to the relationist, absences do not cause anything. So if we want-as I 
want-to hold that the sentence "the orchids died because Flora failed to water 
them" is explanatory but not causal, it cannot be a paraphrase of the relational 
sentence. 
Still, I agree with the nonrelationist (as I have portrayed her) on this much: We 
would do better to use the "because" locution than the "caused" locution when we 
are talking about absences. The nonrelationist should think so because the "because" 
locution is less misleading, whereas I think so because the "because" locution will 
allow us to say something true, whereas the "caused" locution will not. 
I say that common sense is just mistaken when it asserts that an absence or an 
omission caused some event. It's not an especially bad mistake. Often we move be-
tween the "E because C" and "c caused e" locutions without going wrong: It doesn't 
much matter whether I say "the match lit because I struck it" or instead "my striking 
the match caused it to light"; or whether I say "the crash occurred because there was 
an avalanche" or instead "the avalanche caused the crash." Often causal explana-
tions go hand in hand with causal relations between events. Often, but not always. 
When I say "Flora's failure to water the plants caused their death" instead of "the 
death occurred because Flora failed to water them," I say something false instead of 
something true. It's not surprising, nor a matter for particular concern, that we make 
this error in our everyday talk; no serious harm is done. But I see no reason why, 
from a philosophical perspective, we should not rule the move out of order. 
It remains to be shown, of course, that "because" claims involving absences really 
can give information about the causal history of the event to be explained without 
the absence being a cause of that event. What sort of information does such an ex-
planation give us about the event whose occurrence we want to explain? Well, when 
I say that the orchids' death occurred because Flora failed to water them, you learn 
something minimal about the death's causal history: that it did not include an event 
of Flora's watering the orchids. But you also learn something about the causal struc-
ture of nearby worlds where Flora didn't fail to water the orchids-namely, that the 
causal processes that ensued at those worlds did not cause (or perhaps might not 
have caused) the orchids' death. And if you doubted the veracity of my explanation, 
I could fill in more details about how the causal history of the world would have 
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gone had Flora watered the plants: Water would have been taken up by the roots, 
sustained the cell structure, and so on. None of this, of course, is information about 
what causal processes there were in the actual world; it is information about what 
causal processes there are in the closest world(s) where the actually absent event 
occurs. As with program explanation, the information provided about causal history 
is modal information; and it is information that is explanatorily relevant to the 
orchids' death. 
Similarly for Lewis's void. Suppose that as punishment for her negligence, Flora's 
neighbor casts her into the deadly void. Flora's blood boils; the air is sucked from 
her lungs, and so on. If, as I claim, there is no causation by absence, then the void 
causes none of these unfortunate events. Strictly speaking, the void is not deadly-if 
deadliness is the capacity to cause death. But Flora's death is not thereby rendered 
uncaused: There are plenty of positive events going on in her body that do cause 
her death. Nor, on the account offered here, is the void explanatorily irrelevant to 
Flora's death. It's perfectly true to say that Flora's blood boiled because there were 
no forces present-forces that ordinarily keep us alive-to stop it. When we cite the 
void in our explanation of Flora's death, we describe how Flora's causal history 
would have gone had she not been cast into the void. We do not say what actually 
caused her death; rather we point out that the sorts of events that would have caused 
her to remain alive did not occur. 
I see no reason, then, why explanations invoking facts about absences should not 
be seen as genuine causal explanations, even though absences do not cause anything. 
Of course, I have not shown that this relationist account of the role of absences in 
causal explanations is any better than a nonrelationist account like Mellor's, accord-
ing to which facts about absences causally explain in virtue of their being causes. I 
merely hope to have shown that the relationist about causation is not committed to 
denying that absences have a legitimate role to play in our explanatory talk. 
6 Commonsense Judgments and the Pragmatics of Explanation 
It's time to return to the issues discussed in the first three sections of the essay. There 
I argued that commonsense assertions and denials of causation by absence depend on 
considerations-normative features, for example-that have no place in an account 
of the metaphysics of causation. Since, from the perspective of metaphysics, we can 
draw no relevant distinction between, for example, Flora's failure to water the plants 
and your failure to do so, or between Z's failure to attend to his dog's eye infection 
and Z's neighbor's cousin's best friend's failure to do so, the defender of causation by 
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absence must concede that there is much more causation by absence about than we 
ordinarily think there is. The denier of causation by absence, on the other hand, must 
concede that there is much less causation by absence than we ordinarily think there 
is: There is none at all, in fact. 
As a denier of causation by absence, what do I say about the commonsense dis-
tinction between "Flora's failure to water the orchids caused their death" (true) and 
"your failure to water the orchids caused their death" (false)? I say, of course, that 
both are false. But the corresponding explanatory claims ("the orchids died because 
Flora failed to water them"; "the orchids died because you failed to water them") are 
both true. However, they do not, in most contexts, count as equally adequate ex-
planations. When we explain why the orchids died, we must, if our explanation is to 
count as adequate as well as true, be sensitive to why the explanation was requested 
in the first place. In the context where my interlocutor is requesting information that 
is relevant to the issue of whom to blame for the death of the orchids, it would be 
highly misleading of me to say that they died because you didn't water them. The 
truth of my utterance doesn't depend on the moral question of who is to blame; but 
the adequacy of my explanation does, in this context, so depend. Similarly, it's true 
to say that I attended the seminar because I wasn't attacked by a hungry polar bear; 
it's just very hard to imagine a context within which someone who asked me why I 
attended would be satisfied with that explanation. 
Like the distinction between events and absences, the distinction between a true 
explanation-a true "because" statement-and an adequate explanation is one that 
common sense has a tendency to ignore. If you judge that the orchids died because 
Flora didn't water them but not because you didn't water them yourself, or that I 
attended the seminar because I didn't have anything better to do and not because I 
was not attacked by a hungry polar bear, you mistake lack of explanatory salience 
for falsity. 
Of course, the believer in causation by absence can tell the same story. I do not 
claim that my account is any more plausible than that of someone who thinks there 
is causation by absence; I merely hope to have persuaded you that it is no less plau-
sible, and hence that it is no objection to the network model of causation that it 
entails that there is no causation by absence. 
The causal history of the world is a mass of causal processes: Events linked by a 
vast and complex web of causal relations. In order that the causal history of the 
world should look the way it does look, rather than some other way, there must have 
been no extra events impinging on it-for those extra events would have had effects 
that would have changed the causal history of the world in various ways. If Godzilla 
had impinged upon the causal history of the world, that causal history would have 
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gone very differently. We might even, if circumstances demanded it, want to explain 
happenings in the world by citing Godzilla's absence (though it's hard to imagine 
that we should ever want to do so). But I see no need to think of Godzilla's lack of 
impingement as a kind of causation. 
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